Agricultural Leasehold
Agricultural Tenancy
Definition and nature of agricultural tenancy
Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for
the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of
his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable,
whether in produce or in money, or both." (RA 1199 [1954], sec. 3)
In Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA
608 (1992), the Supreme Court held that agricultural tenancy is not
a purely factual relationship. The written agreement of the parties is far more
important as long it is complied with and not contrary to law.
Gelos
vs. Court of Appeals
208
SCRA 608 (1992)
Facts:
Rafael
Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their laborer on a
25,000-sq. m farmland. They executed a written contract which stipulated that
as hired laborer Gelos would receive a daily wage of P5.00. Three (3) years
later, Gelos was informed of the termination of his services and was asked to
vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on the land. Alzona
filed a complaint for illegal detainer. The lower court found Gelos as tenant
of the property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. DHACES
Issue:
What
is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?
Held:
The
parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy agreement. The
agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. . . . The petitioner
would disavow the agreement, but his protestations are less than convincing.
His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to
the contrary in another proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into
signing the agreement does not stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos
Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and
officer of the court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos,
who even read it himself before signing it. . . . Gelos points to the specific
tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests that they are the work of a
tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The work specified is not
peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired laborer
working under the direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not
the nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that
determines the relationship between them. As this Court has stressed in a
number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."
Classes of agricultural tenancy
Agricultural tenancy is classified into share tenancy and leasehold tenancy (M.
A. GERMAN, SHARE AND LEASEHOLD TENANCY, 13 [1995]).
Share tenancy means "the relationship which exists whenever two persons
agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party
furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing
any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the
tenant." (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963].
Sec. 166 [25]).
With the passage of RA 3844, share tenancy has
been declared to be contrary to public policy and abolished (Rep. Act No. 3844[1963], sec. 4) except in the
case of fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts,
cacao, coffee, durian and other similar permanent trees at the time of the
approval of said Act (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963],
sec. 35). When RA 6389 (1971) was
enacted, agricultural share tenancy has been automatically converted to
leasehold but the exemptions remained. It was only under RA 6657 when the exemptions were
expressly repealed.
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or
with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household
undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation
by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household,
belonging to or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed
amount in money or in produce or in both (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 4).
Under RA 6657, the only
agricultural tenancy relation that is recognized is leasehold tenancy. Said law
expressly repealed Sec. 35 of RA 3844, making all tenanted agricultural
lands throughout the country subject to leasehold.
Leasehold tenancy may be established by operation of law, that is, through the
abolition of share tenancy under Sec. 4 of RA 3844; through the exercise by the tenant of
his right to elect leasehold; or by agreement of the parties either orally or
in writing, expressly or impliedly, which was the condition before 1972 (M.A.
German,supra, at 27).
Leasehold relation is instituted in retained areas with tenant(s) under RA 6657 or PD 27 who opts to choose to remain
therein instead of becoming a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural
land with similar or comparable features. The tenant must exercise his option
within one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the
area for retention (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988],
sec. 6). Leasehold relation also exists in all tenanted agricultural lands that
are not yet covered under CARP (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
The institution of leasehold in these areas ensure the protection and
improvement of the tenurial and economic status of tenant-tillers therein. (Rep. Act No. 6657 [1988], sec. 6).
Leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease
In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974), the
Supreme Court distinguished leasehold tenancy from civil law lease.
There
are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease.
The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of
civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and
cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding
in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the
civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is
governed by special laws (at 596).
Elements of Agricultural Tenancy
The following are the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy
relation:
a) The
parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b) The
subject is agricultural land;
c) There
is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land, given either
orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;
d) The
purpose is agricultural production;
e) There
is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate farm household; and
f) There
is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in money and/or
produce. (Carag vs. CA, 151 SCRA 44 [1987]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 [1974]; Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991])
The Supreme Court emphasized in numerous cases that "(a)ll these
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant.
This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws." (Caballes v. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988])
In
the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969), the
Court found all the elements of an agricultural leasehold relation contained in
the contract of lease executed by the parties.
Teodoro
vs. Macaraeg
27
SCRA 7 (1969)
Facts:
Macaraeg
had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past seven (7) years
when he was advised by the latter to vacate the property because it would be
given to another tenant. Thereafter, a new tenant was installed who forbade
Macaraeg from working on the riceland. On the other hand, Teodoro denied that
Macaraeg was his tenant and claimed that he had always leased all of his
39-hectare riceland under civil lease. He further claimed that after the
expiration of his "Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in 1961, the
latter did not anymore renew his contract.
Held:
The
Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements of a
leasehold tenancy agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an
agricultural land devoted to agricultural production. More specifically, the
parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized
for agricultural enterprise only." Furthermore, the parties also
agreed that the farmland must be used for rice production as could be inferred
from the stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per
hectare for one agricultural year . . . must be of the same variety (of palay)
as that produced by the LESSEE."
The
land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an
area of only four and a half (4-1/2) ha. This court has held that even a bigger
area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the
members of his immediate farm household.
From
the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced
by the LESSEE," it can reasonably be inferred that the intention of
the parties was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he did as found
by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant case, petitioner
(Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding belonging to said respondent (Teodoro)
for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a fixed annual
rental." (italics supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg
did not personally cultivate the land in dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege,
much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the cultivation
of the said riceland.
Teodoro
is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the
possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid
in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover,
the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans per
hectare — is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that
the parties did actually enter into a leasehold tenancy relation (at
16-17; underscoring supplied).
Agricultural tenancy relation is different from farm employer-farm employee
relation. The Court clarified the difference in the case ofGelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992), as follows:
On
the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1)
the selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the
power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's conduct —
although the latter is the most important element.
According
to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished
from farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm
employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the
lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor,
and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works
for the farm employer and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless
of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives
his income from the agricultural produce or harvest." (at 614)
Parties: landholder
and tenant
Tenant defined.
A tenant is "a person who by himself, or with the aid available from
within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed
by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder or for a price certain or ascertainable in produce
or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system." (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954],
sec. 5 (a)).
An overseer of a coconut plantation is not considered a tenant.
Zamoras
vs. Su, Jr.
184 SCRA 248 (1990)
Facts:
Zamoras
was hired by Su as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan City. Zamoras was
tasked to have the land titled in Su's name. He was also "assigning
portions of the land to be worked by tenants, supervising the cleaning,
planting, care and cultivation of the land, the harvesting of coconuts and
selling of the copra." As compensation, he was paid salary of P2,400 per
month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of the copra. Su got another 1/3 of
the proceeds while the other third went to the tenants. In 1981, Su obtained a
loan from Anita Hortellano and the latter was authorized by Su to harvest the
coconuts. Meanwhile, he informed Zamoras that he was being temporarily laid-off
until the loan is settled. Zamoras filed a case for illegal termination and
breach of contract before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of
Labor. The Labor Arbiter held that Zamoras' dismissal was without just cause
and ordered Zamoras reinstatement. On appeal, the National Labor Relation
Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter by holding that there is no
employee-employer relation existing between the parties but a landlord-tenant
relation hence jurisdiction rests with the agrarian court. Zamoras assailed the
decision of NLRC.
Held:
The
NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Su and
Zamoras is not supported by the evidence which shows that Zamoras was hired by
Su not as a tenant but as overseer of his coconut plantation. As overseer,
Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned their respective portions which they
cultivated under Zamoras' supervision. The tenants dealt directly with Zamoras
and received their one-third share of the copra produce from him. The evidence
also shows that Zamoras, aside from doing administrative work for Su, regularly
managed the sale of copra processed by the tenants. There is no evidence that
Zamoras cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the aid of his
immediate farm household.
The
following circumstances indicate an employer-employee relationship between
them: 1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut
plantation. 2. His duties were specified by Su. 3. Su controlled and supervised
the performance of his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras should sell the
copra produced from the plantation. 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per
month plus one-third of the copra sales every two months as compensation for
managing the plantation."
There is no tenancy relation because the element of personal cultivation does
not exist.
Castillo
vs. CA
205
SCRA 529 (1992)
Facts:
Alberto
Ignacio filed a complaint for injunction against Castillo alleging that he is
the agricultural tenant of the latter. He claims that Castillo allowed him to
construct a rest house in the property and that, thereafter, Castillo started
cutting fruit-bearing trees on the land and filled with adobe stones the area
intended for vegetables. On the other hand, Castillo denied that Ignacio was
his tenant but that the latter was only a "magsisiga" of the
landholding and that he did not ask permission from Ignacio when he constructed
his rest house. The trial court found no tenancy relationship between the
parties but this was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Held:
The
element of personal cultivation is absent in this case. The alleged tenant
"is a businessman by occupation and this is his principal source of
income. He manufactures hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and poultry farm
as well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To add to
that, the respondent farms the riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos. It is thus
evident that the working hours of the respondent as a businessman and his other
activities do not permit him to undertake the work and obligations of a real
tenant. This is further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent
cannot even personally perform the work of a smudger because on 22 October
1986, the respondent hired some 20 people who are not members of his family to
cut and burn the grass in the premises of the subject land." (at 535-536).
An owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the
contemplation of the law (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 194 (1990).
In Oarde vs. CA, et al., 280 SCRA 235 (1997),
certifications of tenancy/non-tenancy issued by DAR are not conclusive.
"The
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain
person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts, as
ruled by this Court in Cuaño vs. Court of Appeals, citing Puertollano
vs. IAC. Secondly, it is well-settled that the "findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a
tenancy relationship between the contending parties is merely preliminary or
provisional and is not binding upon the courts." (at 246)
Landholder-lessor
A landholder-lessor is defined as "any person, natural or juridical,
either as owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land,
who lets, leases or rents to another said property for purposes of agricultural
production and for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount of
money or produce." (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954],
sec. 42). Thus, consent need not be necessarily given personally by the
registered owner as long as the person giving the consent is the lawful
landholder as defined by law.
Bernas
vs. Court of Appeals
225
SCRA 119 (1993)
Facts:
Natividad
Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to her brother,
Benigno, so that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his
children's education in Manila. The property was leased by Bernas pursuant to a
production sharing arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad
played no part in this arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno
to his sister but when the owners sought to take possession, Bernas refused to
relinquish the property. Bernas was claiming that he was an agricultural lessee
entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for recovery of
possession. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently
reversed by the CA.
Issue:
Is
consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of landowner,
sufficient to create tenancy relationship?
Held:
Yes.
As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity to
enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. "The law
expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute
an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed."
(at 125-126)
Subject is agricultural land
For agricultural tenancy to exist, the subject of the agreement must be an
agricultural land.
RA 6657 defines the term
"agricultural land" as "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land." (see discussion on scope of CARP, Chapter
I). Under RA 3844, "agricultural
land" refers to land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to
crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land.
The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit, but he
should cultivate the entire area leased. The three (3) hectare limit
under RA 6657 applies only
to the award that may be given to the agrarian reform beneficiary.
Consent by landholder
As discussed earlier, consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder
of the property. In Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987), the
Supreme Court held that tenancy relation does not exist where a usurper
cultivates the land.
Hilario
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
148
SCRA 573 (1987)
Facts:
Salvador
Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract executed between him
and Socorro Balagtas involving a two (2)-ha property. According to Baltazar, in
1965, he relinquished 1.5 ha to certain individuals and what remained under his
cultivation was ½-ha owned by Corazon Pengzon. After Socorro's death, no new
contract was executed. Sometime in 1980, the Hilarios started cultivating a
4,000-sq m portion of the property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the
same. The Hilarios claimed that they acquired the landholding from the
Philippine National Bank after a foreclosure proceeding. On the other hand,
Corazon Pengzon explained that she did not get any share from the produce of
the land since 1964 and she would not have accepted it knowing that she did not
own the property anymore.
Held:
Baltazar
is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As held in Tiongson
v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482, tenancy relationship can only be
created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means
and not by imposition or usurpation. "So the mere cultivation of the land
by usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant
and enjoy the protection of security of tenure of the law(Spouses Tiongson
vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)."
Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the
consent are bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the
agricultural land.
Endaya
vs. Court of Appeals
215
SCRA 109 (1992)
Facts:
Spouses
San Diego owned a 2.0200-ha rice and corn land. The property has been
cultivated by Pedro Fideli as a tenant of the couple under a 50-50 sharing
agreement. In 1974, a lease contract was executed between spouses San Diego and
a certain Regino Cassanova for a period of four (4) years at P400.00 per ha per
annum rental and gave him the authority to oversee the planting of crops. The
contract was subsequently renewed to last until 1980. In both cases, Fideli
signed as witness. While the contract was subsisting, Fideli continuously
worked on the property, sharing equally with Cassanova the net produce of the
harvests. In 1980, the land was sold to spouses Endaya. Fideli continued
tilling the land despite the Endaya's demand to vacate the property. Fideli
refused to leave and deposited with Luzon Development Bank the landowner's
share in the harvests. Fideli filed a complaint praying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of the Endayas. The trial court ruled in favor of the
Endayas but the same was subsequently reversed by the CA holding that Fideli is
an agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure.
Held:
It
is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where
the consent of the true and lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine
contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is cultivated without
the landowner's knowledge or against her will or although permission to work on
the farm was given, there was no intention to constitute the worker as the
agricultural lessee of the farm land. The rule finds no application
in the case at bar where the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a
tenanted land over which an agricultural leasehold has long been established. The
consent given by the original owners to constitute private respondent as the
agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds private respondents who,
as successors-in-interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the latter's
shoes, acquiring not only their rights but also their obligations. (at 118;underscoring
supplied).
Purpose is agricultural production
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given
its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.
Caballes
vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
168
SCRA 248 (1988)
Facts:
Spouses
Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale,
Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the property, paying a monthly
rental to the owner. Abajon was also allowed to plant on a portion of the land
and that the produce thereof would be shared by them on a 50-50 basis. When the
new owners took over, they told Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the southern
portion of the property because they would be building a poultry near Abajon's
house. Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they needed the
property. Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that
Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his
cultivation.
Held:
The
fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is
more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or
compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its
southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion. Agricultural
production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear
that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea
Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply
stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Personal cultivation
Cultivation
Under DAR AO 5 (1993),
cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but also
the husbanding of the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry, the taking care of the land and fruits growing thereon, fencing of
certain areas, and the clearing thereof by gathering dried leaves and cutting
of grasses. In coconut lands, cultivation includes the clearing of the
landholding, the gathering of the coconuts, their piling, husking and handling
as well as the processing thereof into copra, although at times with the aid of
hired laborers.
Meaning of "Personal Cultivation"
"Personal cultivation" exists when a person cultivates the land by
himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household.
In Oarde vs. CA, et al., supra,
the Court held that the element of personal cultivation is essential for an
agricultural leasehold. There should be personal cultivation by the tenant or
by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other
persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his
activities (Evangelista vs. CA, 158 SCRA 41).
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work
the land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294),
and the lessee cannot hire many persons to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559). In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, supra,
the Court held that the tenancy relation was severed when the tenant and/or his
immediate farm household ceased from personally working the fishpond when he
became ill and incapacitated.
Compensation in money and/or produce
In Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276
(1981), the Supreme Court held that:
A
tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who,
himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household,
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's
consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system. From the above definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a
sharing arrangement, no tenancy relationship had ever existed between the
parties. What transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare
land area; he was to supervise applications for loans from those residing
therein; he was allowed to build his house thereon and to plant specified
plants without being compensated; he was free to clear and plant the land as
long as he wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him and defendant; and
he was not obligated to pay any price certain to nor share the produce, with
the latter. CaSHAc
Security of Tenure
Under Sec. 7 of RA 1199, "the
agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the
agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided."
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has
been established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure.
The tenant has a right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected
therefrom for cause as provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 [1989]).
Transfer of ownership or legal possession does not affect
security of tenure.
In Tanpingco vs. IAC, 207 SCRA 653
(1992), the Court upheld the validity of donation but the donee must
respect the rights of the tenant and ordered the donee to pay the tenant
disturbance compensation.
Tanpingco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
207
SCRA 653 (1992)
Facts:
In
1985, Tanpingco filed a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation
against Benedicto Horca, Sr. Tanpingco alleged that he is the tenant-lessee in
Horca's riceland under a leasehold contract; that he was asked to desist from
working on the land because it was already donated to the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports; and that he is willing to accept disturbance
compensation or in the alternative to remain as tenant-lessee of the subject
land.
Issue:
Is
the security of tenure of a tenant affected by the transfer of ownership or
legal possession of an agricultural land?
Held:
Under
Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership,
therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked
title to the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the
tenant. Sec. 7 of RA No. 3844, as amended, gives the agricultural
lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship is
established. It also entitles him to security of tenure on his landholding. He
can only be ejected by the court for cause. Time and again, this Court has
guaranteed the continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in cases of a
mere transfer of legal possession. As elucidated in the case of Bernardo
v. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal
concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly
provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when
the agricultural leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in Section 8,
28 and 35 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of
the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the donation
itself is valid." (at 657-658; underscoring supplied).
Constitutionality of the provision on security of tenure
The
constitutionality of the provision on security of tenure has long been settled
by the Supreme Court in the case of Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 101 Phil. 675 (1957).
Primero
vs. Court of Agrarian Relations
101
Phil. 675 (1957)
Facts:
Primero
owns a tenanted riceland in Cavite. Because of his desire to let the property
to one Porfirio Potente, he notified his tenant advising the latter to vacate
the land. The tenant refused. Primero filed a case with CAR which subsequently dismissed
the same. On appeal, Primero assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 9 and 50 of
RA 1199 claiming that said provisions are limitations on freedom of contract, a
denial of equal protection of law, and an impairment of, or limitation on,
property rights.
Held:
The
provisions of law assailed as unconstitutional do not impair the right of the
landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such
transfer or alienation; they only provide that in case of transfer or in case
of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the
landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being
of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee
or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is
to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land
or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal from their
landholdings. Republic Act 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in
the exercise of the police power of the state to promote the commonwealth. It
is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public
welfare of the entire community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like the
previous tenancy laws enacted by our lawmaking body, was passed by congress in
compliance with the constitutional mandates that "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should
be the concern of the State" (Art II, sec. 5) and that "the state
shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant in agriculture"
(Art. XIV, sec. 6). (at 680).
In Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450
(1967), the Supreme Court also held:
Section
49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as amended, enunciates
the principle of security of tenure of the tenants, such that it prescribes
that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for
causes provided by law. The principle is epitomized by the axiom on land tenure
that once a tenant, always a tenant. Attacks on the constitutionality of this
guarantee have centered on the contention that it is a limitation on freedom of
contract, a denial of the equal protection of the law, and an impairment of or
a limitation on property rights. The assault is without reason. The law simply
provides that the tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant
should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant and protect
him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Its termination can take
place only for causes and reasons provided in the law. It was established
pursuant to the social justice precept of the State to promote the common
weal. (Primero vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-10594, May
29, 1957) (at 1456).
Rights and Responsibilities of the
Parties
Rights and responsibilities of lessee
The lessee shall have the following rights:
a) To
have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;
b) To
manage and work on the land in a manner and method of cultivation and harvest
which conform to the proven farm practices;
c) To
mechanize all or any phase of his farm work;
d) To
deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance of quedans and
warehouse receipts of the produce due him/her;
e) To
continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any homelot the lessee
may have occupied upon the effectivity of RA 3844;
f) To
be indemnified for the costs and expenses incurred in the cultivation and for
other expenses incidental to the improvement of the crop in case the lessee
surrenders, abandons or is ejected from the landholding;
g) To
have the right of pre-emption and redemption; and
h) To
be paid disturbance compensation in case the conversion of the farmholding has
been approved (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963],
sec. 23, 24, 25, 11, 12, 36)
On the other hand, the lessee shall have the following responsibilities under
Sec. 26 of RA 3844:
a) Cultivate
and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other improvements on the land
and perform all the work therein in accordance with proven farm practices;
b) Inform
the lessor within a reasonable time of any trespass committed by third persons
on the farm, without prejudice to his/her direct action against the trespasser;
c) Take
reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements delivered to him/her by
the lessor and see to it that they are not used for purposes other than those
intended, or used by another without the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
d) Keep
the farm and growing crops attended to during the work season; and
e) To
pay the lease rental to the lessor when it falls due.
One
of the rights of a lessee is to be entitled to a homelot. But only the
tenant-lessee has this right and that members of the immediate family of the
tenants are not entitled to a homelot.
Cecilleville
Realty and Service Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
278
SCRA 819 (1997)
Facts:
Petitioner
Cecilleville Realty owns a parcel of land, a portion of which is occupied by
Herminigildo Pascual. Despite repeated demands, Herminigildo refused to vacate
the property and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is
helping his mother, the corporation's tenant, to cultivate the property.
Held:
Only
a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or
maintain a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he
is not petitioner's tenant. In fact, he admits that he is a mere member of Ana
Pascual's immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore, we find private
respondent not entitled to a homelot. Neither is he entitled to construct a
house of his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small
landholding of petitioner. . . . Thus, if the Court were to follow private
respondent's argument and allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm
household to construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more
than one thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private
respondent wanted this Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually
converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses.
In sugarcane lands, the lessee shall have the following rights to be exercised
by him personally or through a duly registered cooperative/farmers' association
of which he is a bona fide member (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]):
a) To
enter into a contract with the sugar central millers for the milling of the
sugarcane grown on the leased property;
b) To
be issued a warehouse receipt (quedan) or molasses storage certificate by the
sugar central for the manufactured sugar, molasses and other by-products;
c) To
have free access to the sugar central's factory, facilities, and laboratory for
purposes of checking and/or verifying records and procedures in the processing
of sugarcane through professional representation;
d) To
be furnished a weekly statement of cane and sugar account showing, among other
things, the tonnage of the delivered cane and analysis of the crusher juice;
e) To
be given 30 days notice in writing before the sugar and other by-products are
sold through public auction; and
f) To
be provided with the standard tonnage allocation by the miller/sugar central.
Rights and responsibilities of lessor
The lessor shall have the following rights:
a) To
inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and conditions of
the leasehold contract;
b) To
propose a change in the use of the landholding to other agricultural purposes,
or in the kind of crops planted;
c) To
require the lessee, taking into consideration his/her financial capacity and
the credit facilities available to him/her, to adopt proven farm practices
necessary to the conservation of the land, improvement of the fertility and
increase in productivity; and
d) To
mortgage expected rentals (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963],
sec. 29):
The lessor may propose a change in use but the change shall be agreed upon by
the landowner and the lessee. In case of disagreement, the matter may be
settled by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), or in his
absence the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993])
The lessor shall have the following obligations:
a) To
keep the lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land; and
b) To
keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the landholding at
the start of the leasehold relation (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 30).
Sec. 31 of RA 3844 provides that
the lessor is prohibited to perform any of the following acts:
a) To
dispossess the lessee of his/her landholding except upon authorization by the
Court;
b) To
require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment of the taxes
or part thereof levied by the government on the land;
c) To
require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, any rent or obligation of
the lessor to a third party;
d) To
deal with millers or processors without written authorization of the lessee in
cases where the crop has to be sold in processed form before payment of the
lease rental;
e) To
discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or growth of
unions or organizations of lessees in his/her landholding; and
f) For
coconut lands, indiscriminate cutting of coconut trees will be deemed prima
facie evidence to dispossess the tenant of his/her landholding unless
there is written consent of the lessee and there is PCA certification, copy of
the findings and recommendations of which shall be furnished to affected
tenants or lessees, or a resolution from the Municipal Board allowing the
cutting for valid reasons (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993] and DAR Adm. O. No. 19 [1989]).
Termination of Tenancy Relation
Causes for termination of leasehold relation
Section 8 of RA 3844 provides that
agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished by the following acts or
omissions:
a) Abandonment
of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
b) Voluntary
surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of
which shall be served three months in advance; or
c) Absence
of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of his/her death or permanent
incapacity.
Conversion of the land to non-agricultural uses also extinguishes the leasehold
relation because the subject land is no longer an agricultural land and the
purpose is no longer agricultural production. However, under Sec. 16 of DAR AO 1 (1999), the tenant affected by the
conversion is entitled to disturbance compensation which must be paid within
sixty (60) days from the issuance of the order of conversion.
Abandonment
In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, supra,
it was held that the word "abandon," in its ordinary sense, means to
forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. "The emphasis is on the
finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the
control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests." In other words,
the act of abandonment constitutes actual, absolute and irrevocable desertion
of one's right or property. . . . Likewise, failure to cultivate the land by
reason of the forcible prohibition to do so by a third party cannot also amount
to abandonment, for abandonment presupposes free will." (at 19-20; underscoring
supplied).
Voluntary surrender of property
The tenant's intention to surrender landholding cannot be presumed, much less
determined by mere implication, but must be convincingly and sufficiently
proved.
Nisnisan, et al vs. Court of Appeals
294 SCRA 173 (1998)
Facts:
Spouses
Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a 4.9774 hectare land in Davao
del Sur. Policarpio, the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of said
land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio executed a leasehold contract
which stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978,
Gavino sold two (2) ha of the land, including the land tenanted by Policarpio,
to spouses Mancera. As a result of the sale, Policarpio and family were ousted.
They then filed an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the Manceras. The
Manceras, on the other hand, countered that spouses Nisnisan have no cause of
action because they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
Issue:
Is
the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding?
Held:
Other
than their bare allegations, private respondents failed to present any evidence
to show that petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily
after the private respondents purchased the subject property. Moreover, the
filing of the complaint for reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by
petitioners-spouses against private respondents before the CAR militates
against the private respondents' claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily
surrendered their landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations,
must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The
tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less
determined by mere implication.
Effect of death or permanent incapacity of tenant-lessee
on leasehold relation
Under Sec. 9 of RA 3844, in case of death
or permanent incapacity, the leasehold relation continues between the lessor
and the person who can cultivate the land personally, chosen by the lessor
within one month from such death or incapacity, from among the following:
a) The
surviving spouse;
b) The
eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;
c) The
next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of age.
The age requirement is applied under the presumption that all heirs/successors
are qualified.
The
leasehold relation is not terminated by death or permanent incapacity of the
landholder-lessor. It binds his legal heirs (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 9).
Also, Sec. 10 of RA 3844 provides that
the mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding does not
extinguished leasehold. In these cases, the transferee is subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the lessor.
Dispossession of Tenants
Under Sec. 36 of RA 3844, dispossession of
tenants may be authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
a) The
lessee failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the
contract or with pertinent laws unless the failure is caused by a fortuitous
event or force majeure;
b) The
lessee planted crops or used the land for a purpose other than what has been
previously agreed upon;
(Note:
Under DAR AO 5 [1993], the lessee
is now allowed to intercrop or plant secondary crops after the rental has been
fixed, provided the lessee shoulders the expenses.)
c) The
lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices necessary to conserve the land,
improve its fertility, and increase its productivity taking into consideration
the lessee's financial capacity and the credit facilities available to him;
d) There
has been substantial damage, destruction or unreasonable deterioration of the
land or any permanent improvement thereon due to the fault or negligence of the
lessee;
e) The
lessee failed to pay lease rental on time except when such non-payment is due
to crop failure to the extent of 75% as a result of a fortuitous event;
f) The
lessee employed a sub-lessee; or
g) The
landholding is declared by the DAR to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes subject to payment of disturbance
compensation to the lessee.
(Note:
Under Sec. 36 [1] of RA 3844, as amended
by RA 6389, disturbance
compensation is equivalent to five [5] times the average of the gross harvest
on his landholding during the last five [5] preceding calendar years.)
In the case of Garchitorena vs. Panganiban, 6 SCRA 338
(1962), it was held that when non-payment of lease rentals occurs
for several years, said omission has the effect of depriving the landowner of
the enjoyment of the possession and use of the land.
Under Sec. 36 (1) of RA 3844, as amended, a
lessor who ejects his tenant without the court's authorization shall be liable
for:
a) fine
or imprisonment;
b) damages
suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or imprisonment for
unauthorized dispossession;
c) payment
of attorney's fees incurred by the lessee; and
d) the
reinstatement of the lessee.
Determination of Lease Rentals
The lease rental shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average
normal harvest during the three (3) agricultural years preceding the following
dates:
• 10
September 1971, the date of effectivity of RA 6389for tenanted rice and corn lands;
• 15
June 1988 or date the tenant opted to enter into leasehold agreement, whichever
is sooner, for tenanted sugar lands; or
• 15
June 1988 or date of leasehold agreement by the parties concerned, whichever is
sooner, for all other agricultural lands after deducting the amount used for
seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing
whichever is applicable (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
DAR AO 5 (1993) defines "normal
harvest" as the usual or regular produce obtained from the land when it is
not affected by any fortuitous event like drought, earthquake, volcanic eruption,
and the like. If there had been no normal harvest, the estimated normal harvest
during the three (3) preceding agricultural years shall be considered as the
normal harvest.
"Agricultural year" refers to the period of time required for raising
a particular product, including the preparation of the land, sowing, planting
and harvesting of crops and, whenever applicable, threshing of said crops:
Provided, however, That in case of crops yielding more than one harvest from
one planting, "agricultural year" shall be the period from the
preparation of the land to the first harvest and thereafter from harvest to
harvest. In both cases, the period may be shorter or longer than a calendar
year.
The law states that only the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting,
threshing, loading, hauling, and processing, whichever is applicable, are
considered allowable deductions from the normal harvest in order to determine
the lease rental.
The lease rental shall cover the whole farmholding attended to by the lessee.
Computation of lease rental shall include both primary and secondary crops
existing as of 15 June 1988. Secondary crops which are planted to an aggregate
area of half a hectare or less shall not be included in the computation of the
lease rental (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
If the land has been cultivated for a period of less than three agricultural
years prior to 15 June 1988, the initial rental shall be based on the average
normal harvest during the preceding agricultural years when the land was
actually cultivated.
After the lapse of the first three (3) normal harvests, the final rental shall
be based on the average normal harvest during these three (3) preceding
agricultural years.
